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ABSTRACT 
Water policies have been implemented worldwide to face water stress. However, the 
existence of water users’ groups with opposite interests and different political power clout 
results in the plain failure or low effectiveness of water policy reforms. A better 
understanding of users’ perceptions regarding policy outcomes is important to avoid the 
failure of water policies and the intensification of water conflicts. This paper empirically 
examines the divergent perception of interest groups on the implementation of different 
policies dealing with water scarcity and their proactive involvement with water agencies. 
We have conducted a survey in the Jucar River Basin (a water stressed basin in 
southeastern Spain) to analyze interest group opinions regarding water policy 
effectiveness and water institutions’ performance in water management. Questionnaires 
were sent to the main irrigation districts and urban water utilities within the basin. The 
collected information gives a general picture of the behavior of opposite water interest 
groups in this basin. The analysis of the perceptions on water policy reform between the 
groups highlights the existence of significant differences between preferred measures to 
address water scarcity and lobbying capacity. These differences depend on the size of the 
group, the specific basin location, and other group characteristics.  
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Many water policies and regulation interventions have been implemented globally in 
order to cope with water scarcity and deteriorating water quality, which is affecting 
around half of the world’s population (Mekonnen & Hoekstra, 2016). However, one of 
the main problems with water policies is the uneven outcome of their effectiveness and 
fairness across regions and groups of users. Opposed interests appear in intersectoral 
conflicts (e.g., irrigation vs. residential users) as well as in spatial conflicts among users 
located in different places along a river basin (e.g., upstream vs. downstream users). 
These opposed interests may lead to derailment of the policy reform at stake. The fact 
that water is a shared resource, either directly as a common pool resource (Ostrom, 1990; 
van Oel et al., 2009) or indirectly via stream and return flows from upstream to 
downstream, complicates the relations between groups using the same resource. 
Illustrations of these opposed interests include local, regional, and international examples 
resulting in recurring water disputes (Dinar & Letey, 1991; Giordano & Wolf, 2003; Ward 
& Pulido-Velazquez, 2008).  
There are several studies that address local and regional water conflicts (Hendrix 
& Glaser, 2007; Raleigh & Urdal, 2007; Gizelis & Wooden, 2010; Böhmelt et al., 2014; 
Devlin & Hendrix, 2014), nevertheless a better understanding of the factors and 
characteristics that drive water conflicts are still needed. Gaining a better knowledge on 
the main drivers of basin disputes, and the behavior of interest groups, is essential to 
understand the root causes of many water conflicts. Part of the explanation of a basin 
dispute can be attributed to the local physical, institutional-legal, and socio-economic 
conditions that prevail in the basin—what institutional economists call ‘path 
dependency’. Therefore, the case study approach is quite useful for analyzing specific 
basins. 
In the case of Spain, which is the focus of this paper, water conflicts have been 
common in many regions. Especially relevant are the conflicts over the use of water for 
irrigation in the southern and southeastern basins of Spain, where acute water scarcity 
prevails. The Jucar River Basin in Spain is a major example of a water stressed basin 
where conflicts between stakeholders and regions have prevailed since the 1970s. While 
the basin water authority (Jucar River Basin Authority - JRBA) has implemented different 
policies to address the recurring water shortages, water allocation disputes still prevail.  
Water policy combines political, economic, social, and environmental elements, 




water management, the cooperation between water institutions, governments, and users 
is a requisite. This paper seeks to provide empirical evidence to demonstrate how different 
interest groups share divergent opinions on the reform, namely water institutions’ 
performance and water policies implemented. Several papers have already analyzed water 
users’ perceptions on the suitable policies to manage water shortages and deal with 
drought situations (Greiner et al., 2009; Mertz et al., 2009; Greiner & Gregg, 2011; 
Gandure et al., 2013; Ortega-Reig et al., 2014). In our study area, Urquijo and De Stefano 
(2016) have analyzed irrigators’ perceptions on strategies to face drought. We contribute 
to this literature by implementing a broad survey covering opposite water interest groups 
and diverse water users. This study analyzes their perceptions on the efficiency of 
already-implemented water policies and the water institutions’ performance. 
Furthermore, we also analyze how cooperation between agents and their intrinsic 
characteristics alter their opinions and perceptions on water management in a given basin. 
The essential need for cooperation between stakeholders in water management requires 
better knowledge of the preferred and more effective instruments to better deal with water 
scarcity.  
The purpose of this paper is the following: (1) analyze interest groups’ perceptions 
about the different policy interventions used in the past to address water scarcity; (2) study 
interest groups’ interactions with water authorities to influence the direction of the 
policies; and (3) identify common threads and differences between water interest groups. 
The overall objective is to better comprehend the perception of water policies by the water 
interest groups. We aim to understand how different water users, belonging to opposite 
interest groups, perceive the effectiveness of water policies. The results of this research 
can be important to policymakers seeking to address water scarcity and reduce water 
conflicts between opposite water users and uses, especially in a context of increasing 
water shortages worldwide. 
The water users’ perceptions on water policy reforms are based on the analysis of 
primary data that was collected using a comprehensive survey administered among 
stakeholders in the Jucar Basin. While the outcomes are specific for this basin, the results 
of this study call for the ex-ante evaluation of policies and for a better comprehension of 
the roots of water disputes between interest groups. The results clearly highlight how 
elements such as the size of the group, the level of concentration, or the cropping pattern 
are very relevant factors in conditioning interest group opinions. While there have been 




shortages and droughts (Urquijo & De Stefano, 2016), a better knowledge on the specific 
opinions of these stakeholders is still needed.  
 The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the physical 
characteristics of the study area and presents the main interest groups analyzed in this 
paper and the existing conflicts between them. The data collection and survey 
implementation are briefly explained in the third section. The analysis of the irrigators’ 
perceptions on the implemented water policies in the basin are summarized and analyzed 
in the fourth section, and the water utilities outcomes are explained in section five. Section 
six provides the policy implications gained from the results. Finally, conclusions are 
presented in section seven.  
  
2. THE JUCAR RIVER BASIN: WATER CONFLICTS AND MAIN INTEREST 
GROUPS  
2.1. The Jucar River Basin 
The Jucar Basin is located in southeastern Spain, lying within the regions of Valencia and 
Castilla-La Mancha, and represents the most important basin within the jurisdiction of 
the Jucar River Basin Authority (Fig. 1). This basin covers 22,000 km2 with a population 
density of 120 inhabitants per km2. The per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in the 
main regions of the Jucar Basin (18,000€ and 21,300€, for Albacete and Valencia, 
respectively) is below the national average (24,000€).  
The Jucar Basin extends over a semi-arid region with irregular Mediterranean 
hydrology, which is characterized by dry summers and recurrent drought spells. Surface 
water is provided by dams in the Jucar River and its tributaries, although groundwater 
sources are also very important. The Jucar system also includes two major water 
distribution canals, the Acequia Real and the Canal Jucar-Turia. Most of these water 
resources are used by irrigated agriculture and urban and industrial centers, with the larger 
share going to irrigated agriculture (85%). While long-term mean available water 
resources in the Jucar Basin are 1,700 Mm3 (with 930 surface and 770 groundwater), 
extractions are 1,680 Mm3 leaving the system very unreliable during drought years (Kahil 
et al., 2016).  
 





Agricultural irrigation activities date back centuries, especially in the region of 
Valencia, but nearly 40 years ago new irrigation projects were developed. Currently, the 
basin includes three major irrigation areas (Fig. 1): (1) the Eastern La Mancha aquifer 
irrigation area, located in the upper Jucar (from hereafter—upstream); (2) the more 
modern Canal Jucar-Turia irrigation district located between the lower Turia and the Jucar 
river watersheds; and (3) the traditional irrigation districts in the lower Jucar. Regions (2) 
and (3) are referred from hereafter as downstream. 
The institution in charge of water management and regulation of surface and 
groundwater is the Jucar River Basin Authority (JRBA). This institution, created in 1935, 
is part of the Spanish government but has an autonomous functionality. The JRBA main 
activities are related to water governance, management, planning, cooperation, and 
construction and operation of water infrastructures (Estrela, 2004). A special feature of 
the basin authority is the key role played by stakeholders in the decision-making and 
enforcement processes at both basin and local watershed levels. Stakeholders have 
representation in the JRBA and they can have a real influence in the water management 
of the basin. In order to deal with the growing water scarcity in the basin, three main 
policies have been implemented by the JRBA to address water scarcity: water quotas, 
water rights, and investments in irrigation technology improvements, or irrigation 
modernization.  
1. Water quotas are limits or constraints placed on the amount of water that each 
irrigator can apply per hectare of irrigated land. The purpose of the quota is to 
limit diversions and extractions in order to maintain a sustainable flow of water 
resources, especially during droughts. In periods of water scarcity, the JRBA 
imposes maximum levels of extractions per hectare that cannot be exceeded. Both 
surface and groundwater extraction limits are controlled by the JRBA in 
coordination with the watershed boards.  
2. Water rights are legal entitlements that allow using a given amount of water from 
a particular water body. The Jucar Basin has several ‘senior rights’ (or ‘historical 
water rights’) that belong to downstream irrigators and are associated with 
privileges for traditional irrigators dating past centuries. New legal entitlements 
of water rights have been granted since the 1970s to new irrigation districts such 
as the Eastern La Mancha or the Canal Jucar-Turia districts. While upstream 
irrigators, who started using groundwater in recent decades, were assigned legal 




difference in the recognition of water rights is currently one of the main problems 
between upstream and downstream users.  
3. Irrigation modernization, which is supported by public subsidies, is another 
important water policy oriented towards water efficiency gains. This policy 
involves investments to switch to on-farm water saving irrigation technologies 
(e.g., shifts from flood to sprinkler or drip irrigation technologies). Additionally, 
this policy also includes investments to reduce the losses from water supply 
networks. This policy, which is promoted by the national and state governments, 
is in fact implemented because of the collaboration between farmers and the 
JRBA.  
 
2.2. Water stakeholders 
In this paper we assume that the main water stakeholders in this basin are irrigators, both 
from upstream and downstream. This assumption is based on the fact that the largest share 
of water consumption in the Jucar Basin (85%) is used for agricultural issues. Our analysis 
also includes the urban water utilities that represent urban and industrial water users. 
These two groups allow us to compare differences in water management perceptions 
between opposite interest groups (e.g., upstream vs. downstream irrigators), and also 
between different water uses (e.g., irrigation and urban water uses). While other important 
stakeholders can be identified (e.g., non-governmental organizations [NGOs], 
environmentalists) we based our analysis on the perceptions of the irrigation and urban 
groups.  
 
2.2.1. Upstream water users: the Eastern la Mancha Aquifer  
The Eastern la Mancha aquifer is the largest aquifer in Spain, covering 33% of the total 
Jucar River Basin (7,260 km2) and extending over three provinces (Albacete, Cuenca, and 
Valencia). This groundwater body sustains about 100,000 ha of irrigated agriculture with 
nearly 1,000 landowners. It also supplies water to 275,000 inhabitants in the region of 
Albacete. The aquifer is located in the central high plain with an elevation of about 700 
metres above sea level and with a current water table depth of around 30-40 metres below 
surface level (Sanz et al., 2009). The river and the aquifer have important hydrological 




Upstream farmers in the Jucar River Basin are part of the Eastern la Mancha 
irrigation district that was developed over the La Mancha aquifer from the 1970s onwards 
in the Albacete region. Further expansion of the intensive agriculture raised water 
extractions from 50 Mm3/year in the 1970s to more than 400 Mm3/year in the 1990s. The 
large and maintained pressure over this aquifer led to a significant decline in its water 
table, which almost caused the official declaration of aquifer overexploitation in the 
1980s.  
 
2.2.2. Downstream water users: traditional and modern irrigation districts 
Downstream irrigators are located in the lower Jucar River Basin in the Valencia region. 
Although this interest group is divided into two sub-groups, traditional and modern 
irrigators, both sub-groups pursue the limitation of upstream irrigation affecting 
downstream water availability.  
The traditional irrigators sub-group, located in the lower Jucar River, has its origin 
in the middle ages. Traditional farmers had a profitable agriculture during the 1960s based 
on a longstanding irrigation tradition. Already in the XIII century, these irrigation districts 
obtained their ‘historical water rights’ from King Jaime I that declared the Valencia 
farmers the sole users of the Jucar River. One of the main characteristics of these farmers 
is their ability to exert political pressure, not just at basin but also at national level. 
Traditional irrigation comprises around 35,000 hectares of irrigation with nearly 7,000 
users. 
The modern irrigators sub-group is also located in the lower Jucar and between 
the Jucar and Turia rivers, which is partially located out of the Jucar River Basin. 
Traditionally, this group used groundwater resources from the numerous small aquifers 
spread out along this area. However, the construction of the Jucar-Turia canal in the 1990s 
allowed them to use surface water and to significantly expand their irrigation. Currently, 
this irrigation area comprises 25,000 hectares with nearly 13,000 irrigators.  
 
2.2.3. Urban users: water utilities 
The Jucar Basin supplies water to about 2.4 million people of whom about 90% live in 
the Valencia region (Mediterranean coast). Additionally, there is an important seasonal 
variability in the population because of the massive tourism along the Mediterranean 
coast during summer. The increased urban pressure during the driest months aggravates 




consumption with priority over any other consumption including irrigation. However, 
some water disputes between urban and irrigation users exist, especially in downstream 
Jucar, because of water contamination from irrigation returns flows with significant 
pollution loads.  
 Urban water demand in the Jucar Basin consumes around 210 Mm3/year to supply 
water to 300 municipalities. Nearly 50% of the urban water supplies come from surface 
sources (Jucar River and dams), while the rest originates from aquifers, reservoirs, and a 
small portion from seawater desalination plants. This basin has currently five major water 
companies in charge of the urban water management and distribution. These big water 
utilities supply the water to municipalities and utilities in charge of water distribution 
networks to households and connected industries.  
   
2.3. Water conflicts in the Jucar River Basin 
The growing extractions of water resources in the basin together with frequent droughts, 
have led to serious conflicts between the various water interest groups. Since the 1990s, 
irrigators located upstream and downstream have been engaged in disputes over the 
basin’s water resources and water rights. Conflicts between irrigators and urban users for 
water allocations are not as relevant since Spanish law guarantees the priority of water 
provision to human consumption over all other uses.  
The disputes in the basin erupted because the depletion of the Eastern la Mancha 
aquifer involved serious impacts on the hydrology of the Jucar River downstream. 
Depletion has largely reduced aquifer discharges to the river from around 300 to less than 
50 Mm3 over the past 30 years (Perez-Martin et al., 2014). The progressive decline in the 
Jucar flows has triggered severe negative impacts on downstream farmers, with less water 
available for their irrigation activities. The conflicts between upstream Albacete and 
downstream Valencia irrigators intensified in the 1990s because of an intense drought 
period. The partial desiccation of the Jucar river during the 1995-1996 drought involved 
several negative impacts on the downstream economic activities. In response, 
downstream farmers requested the JRBA and other national authorities to limit upstream 
irrigation water. Realizing the political pressure initiated by downstream irrigators, 




Association (WUA) of Eastern la Mancha (JCRMO)1 was established in order to regulate 
and control groundwater extractions.2  
All these facts are evidence of the significant differences between the main two 
irrigators’ interest groups in terms of both attitudes and political influence. However, 
there are also important differences in the specific characteristics of each group. One 
important difference is the large number of irrigators with smaller landholding sizes in 
downstream compared with upstream. In addition, downstream irrigators (20,000) are 
organized in several (50) heterogeneous3 water user associations, while irrigators 
upstream belong to a single water user association.  
 
3. SURVEY DESIGN 
In order to elicit the opinion of the stakeholders’ groups (upstream irrigators, downstream 
irrigators, and urban water utilities) questionnaires were designed and administered in the 
basin. The objective of the questionnaires was to collect information regarding the 
opinion of individual stakeholders about the policies implemented by the JRBA and also 
about the individual’s (or its representatives) involvement in influencing these policies. 
The development of the questionnaires was discussed in detail with representatives and 
experts from different government levels (basin and water user associations), and 
questionnaires were field-tested for feedback. Three questionnaires were designed, 
responding to the special characteristics of the interest groups: upstream, downstream, 
and urban. The questionnaires are made up of 8 to 11 queries with different items, 
depending on each group characteristics. The queries collect general information on: 1) 
users’ opinions on the three water policies; 2) users’ involvement and participation with 
water institutions at different government levels; 3) users’ perceptions on the specific 
                                                          
1 The WUA (JCRMO - Junta Central de Regantes de la Mancha Oriental) is an autonomous organization 
of users managing the aquifer, being an important stakeholder within the Jucar River Basin Authority. One 
of its main tasks is the control of water withdrawals from the aquifer (upstream). Furthermore, the JCRMO 
is the sole water user association in the upstream (Albacete region).  
2 Farmlands in Albacete are controlled and monitored through the use of remote sensing techniques, coupled 
with crop planting information provided by farmers. This system allows the JCRMO to calculate the amount 
of water extracted by each irrigator, and then it is possible to implement an effective control over the Eastern 
la Mancha aquifer resources. In fact, groundwater extractions have been reduced by 25% during the 2000s 
in that aquifer. 
3 Water user associations downstream are very heterogeneous in terms of member size (ranging from 50 to 
10,000 members), irrigation acreage (ranging from 2 to 21,000 hectares), and also several technical 
characteristics including differences in the source of water (e.g., groundwater, river, canal, etc.). The 





effort and effectiveness of approaching water institutions to influence their decisions. The 
full questionnaires are included in the Supplementary Material.  
The upstream and downstream irrigators’ questionnaires were anonymous and 
randomly distributed to individuals in both locations during February to May 2016. 
Because of the disparity within the structure of the two groups the data collection process 
was different for each location, as explained below. In all, we sent a total of 435 
questionnaires, and we received 369 completed ones, which yields an overall response 
rate of nearly 85%.4 After dropping questionnaires due to missing relevant information, 
we were left with 336 observations: 133 in upstream, 201 in downstream, and 3 from 
urban water utilities. The sampling error is 8% and 6.8% for the surveys of upstream and 
downstream irrigators, respectively, and 43.5% for the water utilities survey.5  
In the case of upstream irrigators, where a single water user association (JCRMO) 
exists, the questionnaire was emailed by the JCRMO. The JCRMO randomly delivered 
the questionnaire to 200 farmers (66% response rate).6  
For downstream irrigators, where the number of water user associations is large 
and users are quite heterogeneous, a stratified random interview procedure was applied 
acquiring 230 observations (87% response rate). The questionnaires were handed to 
irrigators by a consultant visiting the irrigation areas within the Valencia region. Both 
modern and traditional irrigators were approached and they were selected without any 
particular order, so that it can be considered a random sampling independent of any factor 
that could influence the results. The characteristics of this interest group and the lower 
involvement with water user associations affected the number of questionnaires we could 
obtain for this group (number of surveys compared with the number of irrigators in 
downstream).  
Urban and industrial users are represented by water utilities that distribute water 
resources to households and industries. We emailed the questionnaire to the main five big 
companies, using the ‘Google Drive’ application. We received three completed 
questionnaires (response rate of 60%).7 
                                                          
4 Water user associations for both upstream and downstream locations assisted in emailing and handling 
the irrigators’ questionnaires. This produced a very large response rate compared with what could be 
expected from this type of survey.  
5 Significance level at 95%. 
6 The application ‘Google Drive’ was used to create surveys that irrigators completed and submitted online. 
7 We assume that our results are robust base on some premises: (1) in the whole basin there are just five 
main big water utilities; (2) our sample includes water utilities from the two main locations, upstream and 




The responses were processed with Stata 13 for obtaining descriptive statistical 
analyses. Results by interest groups were combined to obtain a comparison between 
groups, especially for downstream and upstream irrigators. Complete sets of statistical 
results are presented in the Appendix (Tables A1, A2, and A3). 
 
4. RESULTS OF IRRIGATORS’ RESPONSES: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS  
This section analyzes the main results from the irrigators’ questionnaires. In this section 
we summarize the main statistics and compare some of the most important results 
between the two interest groups, upstream and downstream.  
 
4.1. Comparison of farmland characteristics between the interest groups 
The first part of the questionnaire is based on irrigators’ landholding characteristics. The 
main attribute that can be observed from the results is the large difference in the 
landholding size and land utilization between the two regions. Upstream irrigators have, 
on average, a considerably larger landholding size (107 ha) with a lower share of fruit-
trees (20.5%) compared with downstream irrigators (2.5 ha plots and 80% fruit-trees). 
While the largest landholding size in upstream is nearly 1,030 hectares and the smallest 
is close to 10 hectares, in downstream the largest landholding is 25 hectares and the lowest 
is close to 0.06 hectares (see Tables A1 and A2, items 1 and 2A-2B). 
An independent sample t-test has been conducted to compare the existence of 
significant differences in the number of hectares and the share of fruit-trees between the 
two interest groups. The results for the landholding size show statistically significant 
differences between the two groups, t(330) = 9.2023, (p = 0.0000). This suggests that the 
mean landholding size in upstream is significantly higher than in downstream (positive t-
test). Similar results have been found for the variable share of fruit-trees, where the 
negative and significant t-test indicates that the share of fruit-trees is higher in the case of 
irrigators downstream compared with irrigators upstream (t(330) = -15.8972, (p = 
0.0000)).8  
 
4.2 Comparison between the irrigators’ opinions on water policies 
In the second part of the questionnaire irrigators were asked about their general opinion 
regarding the three policies implemented in the basin to address water scarcity: (1) water 
                                                          




quotas or limits on extractions (Policy A); (2) legal assignment and distribution of water 
rights (Policy B); and (3) irrigation modernization to increase water efficiency (Policy C). 
We asked irrigators about their general opinion regarding the effectiveness, management, 
and fairness of these policies. The main results are presented in boxplots since this 
representation allows the combination of different statistical measures (Cleff, 2014 pp. 
42). The dotted line through the box corresponds with the median with the upper and 
lower sides being the upper and lower quartiles, respectively. The lines extending from 
the box are the whiskers that determine the lowest and highest observed values. The 
values out of the whiskers correspond to outliers.  
 
FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
A first set of questions reveals the irrigators’ opinions regarding the efficiency of 
each of the three policies implemented (1 = ‘very bad’ and 5 = ‘excellent’). The results 
for both locations (upstream and downstream) are presented in Fig. 2. This boxplot shows 
the existence of meaningful differences between the two interest groups. In the case of 
water quotas (policy A), downstream irrigators have a better opinion compared with 
irrigators upstream. While most of the irrigators downstream score this policy between 3 
and 5 (median = 4); irrigators upstream grade this policy between 2 and 4 (median = 3). 
Opposite results are observed for water rights (policy B), which is better scored by 
irrigators upstream (median = 4) than by irrigators downstream (median = 3). 
Furthermore, the results for this policy show a higher heterogeneity in the opinion in both 
locations.9 Finally, irrigators from both locations have a positive opinion regarding 
irrigation modernization (policy C). But again, some differences arise between the 
groups, while 50% of irrigators upstream perceive this policy as excellent (median = 5) 
in downstream the opinion is not as positive (median = 4). Furthermore, the results in 
downstream present a higher dispersion, with larger distance between the upper and lower 
quartiles and with minimum values of 1 (‘very bad policy’). 
A second set of questions captures the irrigators’ opinions on the performance of 
water authorities in implementing the three policies analyzed. The results for this variable 
(Fig. 3) show more similarities between the groups compared with the previous analysis. 
While some differences can also be observed, the results suggest that both interest groups 
                                                          
9 The irrigators’ opinions on the water rights policy are very disperse for both interest groups: from 2 (‘bad’) 




have a similar opinion of the authorities’ performance in the management of the policies. 
The unique relevant difference remains for the opinion regarding the management of 
water rights (Policy B). Downstream irrigators score this policy with a low value (‘badly 
managed’, median = 2) compared with a more positive outcome in upstream (‘not badly 
managed’, median = 3). 
 
FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE 
 
Finally, the last set of questions deals with the fairness of the policies. Irrigators 
were asked about their opinion regarding the fairness of each of the three policies 
implemented. The results presented in Fig. 4 show important differences between the 
opinions of the upstream and downstream interest groups. In general, irrigators 
downstream have given lower ranks to the fairness of the policies compared with 
irrigators upstream. For example, while upstream irrigators have ranked water quotas as 
medium fairness (median = 3), fairness is considered very poor by downstream irrigators 
(median = 1). Similarly, the results for water rights show significantly better opinion from 
upstream than from downstream irrigators. Finally, although the two groups present the 
same median score in the case of irrigation modernization (median = 3), the opinions in 
upstream are very homogeneous while for downstream the opinions are distributed along 
all scores.  
 
FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE 
 
 Similarly to the previous analysis, an independent sample t-test has been 
conducted to analyze the existence of significant differences between the two interest 
groups (see Appendix, Table A4). The outcomes show how the irrigators’ opinion 
regarding the efficiency of the policies is quite different depending on the location. 
Irrigators downstream have a significantly better opinion of the efficiency of water quotas 
compared with upstream irrigators; and contrary to this, water rights and irrigation 
modernization are significantly better scored by upstream irrigators. Similarly, the 
opinions regarding the fairness of the policies present significant differences between the 
groups. Both, water quotas and water rights are considered significantly fairer by 
upstream irrigators than by downstream irrigators. The results for irrigation 




on the opinions regarding the management of the policies show, in general, no significant 
differences between the two interest groups. Just for the water rights policy, the results 
show that upstream irrigators have a significantly better opinion of the management of 
this policy compared with downstream irrigators.  
To complete the analysis of the users’ opinions regarding the three policies 
implemented in the basin, they were asked to rank these policies from the best (1) to the 
worst (3) in dealing with water shortages. Table 1 presents the frequency distribution of 
the outcomes for both interest groups.  
Results present a general consensus on the best policy (44.7% and 45.5%, for 
upstream and downstream, respectively), which corresponds with irrigation 
modernization (Policy C). However, while in upstream just 18.2% of irrigators think that 
this policy is the worst; in downstream this percentage is 30.9. Significant differences 
appear in the ranking of the worst policy. While for upstream irrigators the worst is water 
quotas (50.8%), for downstream irrigators the worst is the allocation of water rights 
(45.5%). The frequency distribution results also show that, in general, the opinions in 
upstream are more homogeneous than the opinions in downstream for the three policies 
implemented.  
 
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
4.3. Comparison of the users’ involvement with water authorities 
The final variable analyzed is the degree of involvement with water authorities. Fig. 5 
presents a boxplot of irrigators’ involvement with institutions at all government levels. 
The results highlight notable differences in the involvement between the two groups. 
While in the case of upstream irrigators, most of the irrigators declared a medium-large 
involvement with water institutions at all government levels; in downstream the median 
shows no involvement at all. Additionally, large involvement values in downstream (high 
or very high) are considered as outliers.  
An independent sample t-test analysis supports the result highlighted in Fig. 5. 
The outcomes show significant differences between the two groups: t(318) = 14.6965, p 
= 0.0000; t(317) = 18.1716, p = 0.0000; t(306) = 10.6856, p = 0.0000, for local, basin, 
and national participation, respectively.10 For all these variables the results show that 
                                                          





there is a significantly higher involvement, at any government level, of upstream 
irrigators than of downstream irrigators. The smaller size of the upstream group and the 
existence of a unique water user association, which includes almost all users in this area, 
is, in our opinion, the main explanation of the larger involvement of this group.  
 
FIGURE 5 AROUND HERE 
 
5. RESULTS OF WATER UTILITY RESPONSES: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
The descriptive statistics of water utilities show the results for three utilities, which are 
big companies supplying nearly half of the basin’s urban water consumption. The first 
main difference between these utilities is the water source (Table 2). In the case of ‘water 
utility 1’ (U1) more than half of the water supplied originates from surface water (55%), 
and the rest comes from groundwater (20%) and desalinated water (25%). More than half 
of the water supplied by ‘water utility 2’ (U2) originates from desalinated water (54%). 
Finally, the water supplied by ‘water utility 3’ (U3) originates from groundwater 
resources (80%). Although the three utilities are large, there are differences in size with 
U1 supplying three times the water supplied by U2 or U3. Before analyzing the results of 
the urban responses, it is worth remembering that the Spanish law guarantees urban water 
consumption with priority over all other water uses.  
 
TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
The results show notable differences between the upstream water utility and the 
downstream water utilities. Both water utilities located in downstream (U1 and U2) 
perceive the three policies as excellent or good in dealing with water scarcity problems. 
However, the results for the upstream water utility present significant differences. Water 
quotas and irrigation modernization, are considered as ‘medium-efficient’ in dealing with 
water scarcity, while water rights is considered a bad policy (‘low-efficient’). The results 
on the effective management and fairness of the three policies, present a very 
heterogeneous opinion between the utilities. But in general, the opinions for all utilities 
are negative on both the management and the fairness of the policies.11  
                                                          
11 Two exceptions are the positive opinion score of ‘very good’ for management of water quotas by water 




Finally, both downstream utilities ranked the policies similarly with irrigation 
modernization being the best, and water quotas being the worst. Again, the outcomes of 
the upstream water utility present notable divergences concerning the ranking of policies 
compared with downstream utilities. In the case of this utility, the best policy is the 
implementation of water quotas while the worst one is the allocation of water rights.  
 
FIGURE 6 AROUND HERE 
 
Similarly to the analysis of the irrigators, we were interested in knowing the level 
of participation and involvement of the utilities with water authorities. The results in Fig. 
6 reveal a high participation at basin level for both downstream utilities. However, 
differences are seen for national level involvement: while U2 is highly involved with 
national authorities, U1 is not involved at all. In the case of the upstream water utility 
(U3), the results show a low involvement with water authorities at any government level.  
 
6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The analysis in the previous sections is used to gain several political insights across the 
different interest groups. This contributes to better understanding of the differences 
between groups’ behavior and to shed light on the nature of the conflicts in the basin. We 
provide below six policy intuitions that are derived from the analysis. 
 
Policy intuition 1: In general, groups with small membership and with sizable 
landholdings are more organized than groups with large and heterogeneous membership 
and smaller landholdings.  
The results show that upstream irrigators, around 1,000 users, are organized in a 
single water user association, while more than 50 water user associations coexist in 
downstream with 20,000 users. Small groups with clear common interests display more 
homogeneous opinions, and become easier to organize in a single organization. This 
finding suggests that upstream farmers have better conditions to be a more effective 
interest group given the similar interests, better coordination, and lower transaction costs 
of small group size.  
 
Policy intuition 2: The specific location of the group is a key factor affecting the opinions 




The results on political opinions (efficiency, management, and fairness) on the 
water policies implemented in the basin reveal large differences between the interest 
groups. Furthermore, the survey outcomes reveal sizable differences in the opinions on 
preferred instruments for dealing with water scarcity, depending on the spatial location. 
Although upstream and downstream irrigators agree on the best policy to address water 
shortages, there are important differences in opinions. Especially relevant are the 
differences in opinions regarding the worst policy. Similar results are found for the water 
utilities, where utilities downstream share opinions which are different from the utility 
upstream.  
 
Policy intuition 3: More organized interest groups seem to be more proactive and 
involved with authorities and policymakers.  
The results suggest that irrigators upstream, that are more organized and 
coordinated within a single water user association, have a higher level of involvement 
and participation in influencing policymakers and authorities. In general, the opinions of 
upstream irrigators are more homogenous than opinions of downstream irrigators. People 
belonging to a group share similar perceptions, and this is an important result associated 
with the fact of being a more organized and effective interest group. The disparity in 
opinions is boosted by the presence of numerous water user associations, undermining 
their lobbying capacity.  
The level of involvement and participation with water authorities is a very 
important issue in water policy. In order to elaborate effective policy reforms, the 
participation of stakeholders is a necessary element, and especially, in the case of public 
goods and common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990).12  
 
Policy intuition 4: The degree of involvement depends on the level of government (local, 
regional, or national) that the interest group lobbies and the stakeholders’ location. 
The results indicate that the level of government determines the degree of interest group 
involvement. The largest level of involvement is at basin level while the lowest level is 
                                                          
12 An additional insight for the large difference in the effective organization and participation between the 
two irrigation interest groups could be explained by economic factors. While most of the income of 
upstream users relies on irrigation, in downstream many users have other main economic activities besides 
irrigation, and thus agriculture is not their major source of income. This is an important element that could 
also explain differences in participation and lobbying. We have not analyzed these issues in the paper due 





associated with national-level water authorities. Most of the upstream irrigators declare 
that they are highly involved with basin authorities while asserting medium-level 
involvement with national authorities. For water supplying companies, the results also 
suggest that involvement with water agencies at any government level is also conditioned 
by the location of the water utility.  
This can be an important result for policymakers in order to promote the 
implementation of water policies at different government levels. Depending on the degree 
of cooperation required, regional and basin water institutions should be the institutions in 
charge of the policy management instead of national agencies.  
 
Policy intuition 5: There are notable differences in the perception of efficiency and 
fairness of water policies between interest groups. However, more homogeneous opinions 
have been found on the management of water policies. 
Results show that the general opinion on policies (efficiency and fairness) is quite 
different depending on the interest group. However, the opinion regarding the authorities’ 
performance in managing the policies seems to be quite similar for all interest groups. In 
addition, more organized and involved interest groups reveal the most homogeneous 
opinions. 
 
Policy intuition 6: Besides the location of the interest group, the sector is also a factor 
conditioning their perception about water policies and institutions. 
The results highlight how urban water utilities and irrigator groups located in the 
same area, share different opinions regarding the best water policies to face water 
shortages. Furthermore, there are also notable differences in the involvement with water 
authorities depending on the sector they operate.  
 The interest group location (upstream vs. downstream) largely conditions their 
behavior in terms of involvement with water organizations and opinion of water policies. 
But also the sector of the interest group (irrigators vs. urban utilities) is an element that 
determines the behavior and participation level of groups.  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS  
This paper analyzes the perceptions of different interest groups regarding policies and 
institutions addressing water scarcity. Stakeholders’ perceptions have been elicited with 




southeastern Spain. The development of irrigated agriculture with growing water 
withdrawals, together with differences in the interest groups’ political clout, have 
triggered harsh water disputes between sectors and regions.  
The results of the interest groups’ survey show the perceptions that agricultural 
and urban users have on the policies implemented in the Jucar Basin to address water 
scarcity. The results show considerable differences among interest groups, driven by 
landholding size and number of farms, basin location, interest group sector, and the 
strength of local organizations. These differences are the main factors explaining the 
users’ opinions regarding water policies and the involvement and lobbying with water 
authorities. These outcomes are similar to other research results that also highlight how 
groups of water stakeholders with diverse local conditions share different opinions of 
water policies (Urquijo & De Stefano, 2016).  
The paper contributes to the literature on water policy reform by highlighting the 
existence of substantial differences between preferred instruments to manage water 
resources between water users and uses. First of all, a very relevant outcome is the fact 
that most of the surveyed users agreed that irrigation modernization is the best policy in 
dealing with water scarcity. However, large differences can be observed in the users’ 
perceptions of the effectiveness of water quotas and water rights as suitable instruments 
to deal with water shortages. The existence of large differences in users’ perceptions on 
the fairness and efficiency of water policy instruments is also a very relevant element to 
be taken into account by policymakers. Finally, results show that well organized users are 
more homogeneous in their preferences and opinions, and they have a better appreciation 
of water policies and institutions.  
Good knowledge of the perceptions displayed by the groups of stakeholders can 
be useful for inducing enhanced cooperation between users and authorities, and for using 
more efficient instruments to address water stress in river basins. Efficient water policies 
require collaboration and cooperation among all stakeholders in order to find a worthy 
solution satisfying every group. These findings provide useful policy insights that could 
be relevant for water policy making and the design of sound and viable policy regulations.
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Figure 1. The Jucar River Basin  
Figure 2. Irrigators’ opinions on the efficiency of the implemented policies  
Figure 3. Irrigators’ opinions on the management of the implemented policies  




Figure 5. Irrigators’ participation with water authorities 
Figure 6. Water utilities’ participation with water authorities  
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